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A Coasian Approach to Efficient Water
Allocation of a Transboundary River
David B. Willis and Justin S. Baker
The United States and Mexico recently resolved a decade-old water dispute that required
Mexico to repay the accumulated water debt within one year. A Coasian analysis estimates
the social welfare gains attainable to each country under an alternative debt repayment
scheme that allows repayment over a longer time horizon and in a combinationo fd o l l a r s
and water, instead of solely in water. Assuming average water supply conditions, under the
agreed 1-year repayment contract, U.S. compensation value is 534% greater and Mexico’s
compensation cost is 60% less relative to when compensation is paid exclusively in water.
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Under the Treaty of 1944 between the United
States and Mexico, Mexico is obligated to
annually release 350,000 acre-feet of water,
the majority of which originates in Mexico’s
Rio Conchos River Basin (RCB), to the U.S.
Lower Rio Grande Valley (LRGV) by way of
the Rio Grande tributaries (Treaty of 1944).
Between 1992 and 2003, Mexico failed to
comply with the annual treaty releases, and
amassed a cumulative water deficit of 1.5 mil-
lion acre-feet (maf). After extended negotia-
tions, Mexico agreed to repay the cumulative
water deficit in one year beginning in late 2004
with complete water repayment by September
2005. Alternative repayment schemes that did
not require repayment exclusively in water,
but instead allowed repayment to be paid over
a longer time horizon and in a combination of
dollars and water, would have been mutually
beneficial to both countries. This paper
estimates the potential welfare gains to Mex-
ico and the United States if a Coasian type
repayment approach had been used in the
negotiation process and Mexico had been
allowed to repay its cumulative deficit in
dollars and/or water relative to the negotiated
settlement.
Geographic Setting
T h eT r e a t yo f1 9 4 4r e q u i r e sM e x i c ot o
annually release 350,000 acre-feet of water
into the Rio Grande River that is subsequently
redirected into one of two international
reservoirs, the Amistad and Falcon, for U.S.
use. The Amistad reservoir is located just west
of Del Rio, TX along the Rio Grande, and the
Falcon reservoir is located further southeast,
near Laredo, TX. From these two reservoirs,
the U.S. share of the stored water supplies is
allocated to municipalities for domestic and
industrial use, or to irrigation districts to be
redirected to farmers for irrigation purposes.
Priority is given to municipal use, followed by
industrial and agricultural uses.
Mexico argued the accumulated 1.5 maf
debt was caused by a series of droughts in the
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irrigation water use in Mexico’s Rio Conchos
Basin (RCB) increased from 2.0 maf to 4.5
maf. Adcock, Hobbs, and Rosson believe this
rapid increase in agricultural water use was the
primary cause for the LRGV water shortage.
In 2003, Susan Combs, the Texas State
Agricultural Commissioner, stated that farm-
ers in the LRGV had suffered economic
damages in excess of $1 billion because of
Mexico’s noncompliance (Combs). Combs’
value was based on a study by Robinson that
estimated the average gross value of irrigation
water in the LRGV at $652 per acre-foot.
Even though Combs’ estimate was a gross
value estimate of damages and not a net
damage value, Mexico’s accumulated water
deficit did impose significant economic dam-
ages on LRGV farmers because the undeliv-
ered water would have generated economic
profits in agricultural production.
Conceptual Model
In his seminal article, ‘‘The Problem of Social
Cost,’’ Coase argues that bilateral negotia-
tions will result in an economically efficient
resource allocation as long as a property right
to the resource has been assigned, regardless
of the initial property right assignment. The
Treaty of 1944 provides the necessary proper-
ty right assignment regarding the initial water
allocation for Coasian negotiations to deter-
mine the social welfare maximizing water
allocation level for the two countries.
Information for both the marginal net
benefit of water repayment to the United States
and the marginal net cost of repayment to
Mexico is required before Coasian bargaining
can commence. A stylized illustration of the
U.S. marginal damage function (MDUS)a n d
Mexico’s net value marginal product function
(NVMPM) for potential water deficit levels is
presented in Figure 1. The MDUS and the
NVMPM curves are drawn for an arbitrary
initial watersupplylevelineach countrybefore
any deficit repayment is made. Assuming a
fixed quantity of acreage can be irrigated in
each region and a diminishing marginal net
return to irrigation water supplies in each
country, the more abundant the initial water
supplyinaeachregionthelowerthenetbenefit
of repayment to the United States and the
lower Mexico’s net marginal repayment cost.
Figure 1. NVMPM in the Rio Concho Basin and MDUS in the LRGV for Alternative Water
Deficit Levels
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because as the U.S. deficit level increases,
increasingly valuable irrigated crop acreage is
forced out of production. Each point on the
MDUS curve represents the marginal net value
produced in the LRGV as each unit of the
deficit water is repaid by Mexico. The MDUS
curve has been implicitly shifted downward to
account for transit losses such as seepage and
evaporation losses. Not every acre-foot of
water released by Mexico is ultimately deliv-
ered to the LRGV.
The NVMPM curve slope is negative
because for a given initial water supply, each
additional unit of nonreleased water retained
by Mexico is used in irrigation at a decreasing
marginal net value to Mexico. Three potential
deficit levels are identified on the horizontal
axis of Figure 1. Deficit V1 is the lowest and
V3 is the highest.
At deficit level V1 an additional acre-foot
of water used in agricultural production in
Mexico produces a higher net value in Mexico
(NVMPM) than the same acre-foot of deficit
water, if released, would produce in the
United States after accounting for delivery
loses. This is true for all units of the deficit less
than V1. Thus at deficit level V1,i ti so p t i m a l
for Mexico to repay the entire debt exclusively
in cash and not water. For example, if after
negotiations the United States agreed to
accept a cash payment of le dollars per acre-
foot for nondelivered water, a total payment
equal to the area 0V1Yle in Figure 1 is paid.
The net compensation dollar gain to the
United States is equal to area CXYle,a n d
the net reduction in compensation cost to
Mexico is equal to area DZYle.
At the highest deficit level illustrated, V3,
the MDUS value is greater than the NVMPM
value. However, the MDUS value is not greater
than NVMPM value over the entire deficit
range and is less at deficit levels below V2.I n
this situation, the portion of the deficit equal
to V3 minus V2 (V3 2 V2) should be repaid in
water and the remaining deficit quantity (V2)
should be repaid in dollars at the shadow price
value le, where MDUS 5 NVMPM. The dollar
value of the payment made to the United
States is the rectangular area (OV2Ble)i n
Figure 1. The collective social welfare of both
countries is increased by triangle CBD relative
to the situation where repayment is made
entirely in water. The U.S. net increase is
equal to triangle leBC and the net reduction in
repayment cost to Mexico is equal to area
leBD. As Figure 1 illustrates, there are
situations where the optimal repayment
scheme should allow repayment to be paid in
a combination of water and dollars.
As shown in Figure 1, water is efficiently
allocated between the two countries when the
net marginal value of an additional acre-foot
of deficit water released by Mexico to the
United States is equal for each country. When
a fraction of the water released by one country
to another is lost in transit, the efficiency
condition needs to be modified to account for
any transit losses before the released water is
received by the second country. The efficiency
condition must also be adjusted to control for
transit losses between the point of diversion
and where the water is agriculturally used in
the country controlling the water supply. The
new efficiency condition dictates that the per
acre-foot NVMP of water in Mexico discount-
ed by the factor (12W) of water released must
be equal to the NVMP of water in the United
States discounted by the factor (12d)w h e r eW
and d are the respective transit loss percent-
ages for each country. Recognizing that the
NVMPUS forgone due to noncompliance by
Mexico is MDUS, the efficiency condition for
optimal repayment in water is mathematically
expressed as:
ð1Þ NVMPM 1 { W ðÞ ~ MDUS 1 { d ðÞ
Empirical Model
Existing mathematical programming models
were updated and modified to estimate the net
value marginal product functions, hereafter
referredtoasthenetmarginalbenefitfunctions,
foragricultural wateruseintheLRGV, andfor
agricultural water use in the Delicias Irrigation
District (DID) in Mexico’s Rio Conchos Basin
(RCB).TheDIDistheprimaryuserofirrigated
water supplies in the RCB, accounting for 80%
of all water use. The adapted and updated
Willis and Baker: A Coasian Approach to Efficient Water Allocation 475mathematicalmodelswereoriginallydeveloped
by Robinson for the LRGV, and Puente–
Gonzalez 2002 for the DID.
The net marginal benefit function of
agricultural water use in each country was
estimated using valuation data simulated by
the mathematical programming models. This
was accomplished by initially optimizing the
agricultural water use model for each country
without a binding water supply restriction to
determine the maximum volume of water that
could be profitably used in each country under
average weather conditions, existing acreage
restrictions, soil types, crop rotations, and
technology. A complete discussion of the
mathematical programming model is found
in Baker. Given the modeling assumptions,
the maximum quantity of water that can be
profitably used by irrigated agriculture in the
LRGV is 1,410,000 acre-feet per year, and the
comparable annual maximum use in the DID
is 1,200,000 acre-feet. The optimization model
for each country was subsequently reopti-
mized for alternative water supply levels by
parametrically varying the water supply level
downward in 10,000 acre-foot increments
beginning at the level where water supply
was not a constraining resource. For each
alternative supply level the shadow price of the
water supply constraint was recorded.
The appropriate paired shadow price value
and water supply value were subsequently used
in two regression equations to estimate the net
marginal benefit function for each country as a
function of water supply. As expected, the net
marginal benefit of water is negatively related
to the water supply level. The estimated net
marginal benefit functions for the United
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As reported by the t-value in parentheses
below each coefficient value, all estimated
coefficients are significant at the .01 level, or
higher, in both equations. The R
2 statistic for
the U.S. net marginal benefit equation is 0.999
and the R
2 value for the Mexican net marginal
benefit function is 0.858. A slope shifting
indicator variable (d) was used in the estima-
tion of the NMBUS function to control for the
impact that high value citrus and melon crops
grown in the LRGV have on the net marginal
benefit function. High profit citrus and melon
crops are the last crops to go out of production
as water supply becomes increasingly scarce.
The NMBUS is approximately $200 at
330,000 acre-feet of water, but jumps to
$1,165 per acre-foot when water supply is
reduced to 320,000 acre-feet. The indicator
variable was assigned a value of one when
U.S. water supply (WUS) was greater than
320,000 af and a value of zero otherwise.
To control for the impact that transit losses
have on the net marginal benefit of water
released by Mexico for use in the LRGV, the
net marginal benefit of repaid deficit water
supplies was discounted by 48.8%.O n l y5 1 . 2 %
of the water released by Mexico generates
agricultural value in the LRGV due to transit
and application losses (Brandes). Water re-
leased by Mexico from the Rio Conchos Basin
for delivery to the LRGV has an average
conveyance loss of 17.5% before reaching the
Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs (Robinson).
An additional 17.0% of released flows are lost
in transit between the two international
reservoirs and the irrigation district pumping
stations in the LRGV (Robinson). Finally,
intra-district conveyance losses in the LRGV
average 25.3% (Robinson). The estimated
MDUS function was adjusted downward by
48.8% to account for the reality that not all
water released by Mexico from the Rio
Conchos is ultimately used on-farm in the
LRGV. Conveyance loss from the Rio Con-
chos to the DID was estimated at 15.0%
(Puente–Gonzales 2003) and NMBM function
was accordingly adjusted for these losses.
Because the net marginal benefit functions
are a function of water supply level, the value
of compensation and the optimal quantity of
476 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008the deficit repaid in water vary with each
country’s initial water endowment and the size
of the water deficit. In a given year, the last
unit of water repaid has the lowest net
marginal value to the United States, and the
first unit repaid has the highest net marginal
value. Conversely, the first unit of deficit
repaid by Mexico imposes the lowest marginal
cost on Mexico and the last unit repaid comes
at the highest marginal cost.
Graphical Analysis
In this section, the net marginal benefit
functions are used to derive the Coasian gains
achievable by broadening Mexico’s deficit
repayment options to allow repayment in both
dollars and water, instead of strictly in water.
Coasian gains are estimated for nine combi-
nations of three repayment contract lengths
and three initial water supply scenarios. The
water supply scenarios correspond to below
average, average, and above average water
supply conditions in each country. The supply
levels were derived from historic water use
records and are reported in Table 1. The first
repayment contract requires that the entire
1.5 million acre-feet deficit is repaid in 1 year
as per the current negotiated agreement,
whereas the second repayment contract allows
the deficit to be repaid over 5 years in
300,000 acre-feet annual payments, and the
third repayment contract has a 10-year length,
where 150,000 acre-feet is repaid each year.
To establish a frame of reference for the
benefits of the subsequent Coasian negotiation
approach, the U.S. value of compensation and
cost of compensation to Mexico was calculat-
ed for all three alternative contract lengths and
initial water supply combinations, under the
assumption that compensation was exclusively
paid in water. Table 2 presents these results.
As expected, for a given contract length, the
results show that as the initial water supply is
increased in both countries, both the benefit
and cost of water repayment decreases.
Moreover, for a given water supply level, the
net present value of compensation to the U.S.
increases and the net present value cost of
repayment to Mexico deceases as the contract
length is increased. For a given initial water
supply level in each country, as the length of
the contract increases, the volume of water
repaid in each time period is decreased and the
last unit repaid in each period has a lower
marginal net cost in Mexico and a higher
marginal net benefit in the United States.
The net economic gains to the United
States and Mexico achieved under Coasian
negotiations, relative to similar contracts
requiring repayment exclusively in terms of
water are reported in Table 3 for the nine
combinations of three repayment time hori-
zons and three water supply scenarios. The 5-
year repayment plan under low, average, and
high water supply conditions are now dis-
cussed in detail.
Five-Year Repayment with Low
Water Supplies
Under low water supply conditions, 600,000
acre-feet of water is initially available for U.S.
irrigation use in the LRGV, and Mexico’s
DID initial water supply level is 300,000 acre-
feet before any water repayment. The appro-
priate NMBM and the MDUS curves are
plotted in Figure 2 for the 5-year repayment
contract under low water supply conditions.
The marginal damage (MDUS) function is the
mirror image of the NMBUS function dis-
counted for transit losses and measures the net
Table 1. Average Agricultural Water Use in the LRGV and Rio Conchos Basin under
Alternative Supply Conditions
LRGV Agricultural Use Rio Conchos Basin Agricultural Use
Low water supply 600,000 acre-feet 300,000 acre-feet
Average water supply 900,000 acre-feet 850,000 acre-feet
High water supply 1,200,000 acre-feet 1,200,000 acre-feet
Source: Rakestraw, K. International Boundaries and Water Commission. Personal communication. July 2005.
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LRGV production agriculture for each addi-
tional unit of nonrepaid water withheld by
Mexico. Under low water supply conditions,
the MDUS curve extends to 810,000 acre-feet
because a maximum of 1.41 maf of water can
profitably be used under average weather
conditions in a year in the LRGV. The length
of the MDUS curve is the difference between
the maximum volume of water that can
profitably used in agricultural production in
a year less the initial water supply level
(1,410,000–600,000 acre-feet). It is assumed
agricultural producers in the LRGV will apply
their initial 600,000 acre-feet supply to their
most profitable crops. Consequently, the net
marginal benefit of the first acre-foot of water
repaid is equal to the shadow price of water
corresponding to a shortage level of 810,000
acre-feet of water ($35.49). The relevant
portion of the MDUS function for calculating
the value of deficit repayment begins
810,000 acre-feet, identified at WUS in Fig-
ure 2, and extends leftward to the vertical axis
where the MDUS function has a shadow price
value of $0 per acre-foot at the full water
supply level of 1.41 million acre-feet.
The initial Mexican water supply in the
DID (WM), is 300,000 acre-feet, and as deficit
repayment is simulated the first acre-foot of
water repaid by Mexico has a marginal cost of
$29.93, Mexico’s shadow price for the
300,000th acre-foot ofwater agriculturally used
in the DID. As water repayment to the United
States is increased, Mexico’s marginal cost of
repayment increases until the 300,000th acre-
foot is repaid at a marginal net economic cost
of about $98. After Mexico releases the
300,000 acre-feet deficit repayment from the
DID’s water supply, the DID’s residual district
water supply is zero and is identified as WM 2
V in Figure 2, where V is the 300,000 acre-feet
contractual repayment required under the 5-
year repayment contract. The total cost to
Mexico of releasing 300,000 acre-feet is the
area under Mexico’s net marginal benefit of
water curve (NMBM) between zero and
300,000 acre-feet. Once Mexico pays the re-
quired 300,000 acre-feet payment, the remain-
ing agricultural water shortage in the LRGV is
510,000 and is labeled WUS 2 V.
Despite the differences in the acre-foot
lengths for the MDUS and NMBM curves, the
Coasian approach can be used to determine
Table 2. Value of U.S. Compensation and Mexico’s Cost of Compensation under Alternative







One-year low supply 1,500,000 $9,739.590 ($9,739,590) $73,756,735 ($73,756,735)
Five-year low supply 1,500,000 (300,000
per year)
$7,069,334 ($33,346,742) $14,751,347 ($69,583,555)
Ten-year low supply 1,500,000 (150,000
per year)
$4,345,135 ($38,176,832) $5,376,191 ($47,235,803)
One-year average supply 1,500,000 $2,670,246 ($2,670,246) $43,713,262 ($43,713,262)
Five-year average supply 1,500,000 (300,000
per year)
$2,371,158 (11,184,987) $4,138,050 ($19,519,589)
Ten-year average supply 1,500,000 (150,000
per year)
$1,580,012 ($13,882,158) $1,757,489 ($15,441,793)
One-year high supply 1,500,000 $299,088 ($299,088) $32,414,660 ($32,414,660)
Five-year high supply 1,500,000 (300,000
per year)
$299,088 ($1,410,827) $1,773,604 ($8,366,263)
Ten-year high supply 1,500,000 (150,000
per year)
$279,279 ($2,453,774) $680,034 ($5,974,855)
a The first value reported represents the cost/benefit of water compensation in the first repayment year and the parenthetical
values represent the NPV of water compensation over the entire contract length, using a 3% discount rate.
478 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008the optimal combination of water and dollar
repayment that maximizes the collective welfare
of both countries. In the absence of Coasian
negotiations, Mexico is contractually obligated
to divert the entire 300,000 acre-feet of the
DID’s water supply each year to satisfy the
repayment contract. This repayment scheme
imposes a heavy compensation cost on Mexico’s
DID, and the net cost of much of the water
released by Mexico exceeds the net economic
value the released supplies will produce in
agricultural production in the LRGV.
Under the Coasian approach, Mexico
annually repays 34,000 acre-feet of the deficit
in water. At this water repayment level, the net
marginal benefit of deficit water releases in
agricultural production is equal for both
countries at a value of $32.25 per acre-foot,
the equilibriumshadowprice, le. AfterMexico
repays 34,000 acre-feet of the deficit in water,
Ve in Figure 2, the DID’s remaining water
supply is 266,000 acre-feet (WM 2 Ve) and
the effective water shortage level in the
LRGV is decreased from 810,000 to 776,000
acre-feet (WUS 2 Ve). Repaying more than Ve
of the deficit in water imposes a greater net
marginal cost on Mexico than the net marginal
benefit to the United States. If each acre-foot
of the residual contract obligation, V 2 Ve,
(300,000–34,000) is repaid at the equilibrium
Table 3. Coasian Gains to the U.S. and Mexico under Alternative Repayment Time Horizons













































































































Note: The equilibrium shadow price of water, le, is $32.25 acre-feet for the low water supply scenario, $11.20 acre-feet for the
average water supply scenario, and $3.27 for the high water supply scenario.
a The first value reported represents the cost/benefit of compensation in the first repayment year and the parenthetical values
represent the NPV of compensation over the entire contract length, using a 3% discount rate.
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payment is le *[V 2 Ve], and Mexico’s
compensation cost is less than if Mexico
exclusively repaid in water. Conversely, the
U. S. net economic benefit is greater than when
compensation is exclusively paid in water. Over
the 5-year contract, the annual net Coasian
gains to the United States and Mexico,
respectively, are $2.7 million and $5.1 million.
As reported in Table 3, the net present values
for the Coasian gains over the 5-year contract
are $12.5 million for the United States and
$24.1 million for Mexico. Equations 4 and 5
are respectively used to calculate the net gains
to the United States and Mexico.
ð4Þ
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Where:
le 5 shadow price of water at the
intersection of the MDUS and
NMBM curves;
Ve 5 optimal quantity of the deficit
repaid in water, found as the
intersection point of the MDUS
and NMBM curves; and
V 5 total water deficit or annual
contracted water repayment
value.
In Equation 4, the annual net gain to the
United States is computed as the difference
between the value of the dollar payment made
to the United States and the net economic
value the water, if delivered to the LRGV,
would have produced in agricultural produc-
tion in the LRGV. Conversely, as shown in
Equation 5, the net gain to Mexico’s DID is
the net economic value the nonreleased water
Figure 2. Coasian Solution: Five-Year Deficit Repayment Policy, Low Water Supply
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the dollar compensation payment made to the
United States.
Five-Year Repayment with Average
Water Supplies
Figure 3 portrays the Coasian solution with
average water supply conditions in each
country. With average water supplies, the
LRGV has an initial water allocation of
900,000 acre-feet for irrigation use, and Mex-
ico’s DID initial water supply is 850,000 acre-
feet (WM). Under these conditions, the MDUS
curve extends only to 510,000 acre-feet (WUS),
and the NMBM curve has a length of
850,000 acre-feet before any water repayment.
The NMBM values for the first 300,000 acre-
feet are identical to their values for the low
water supply condition and the additional
550,000 acre-feet of length represent the addi-
tional net economic value the additional water
supplies when efficiently used would produce
in Mexico’s DID. The MDUS curve length is
shorter because under an average water supply
level, the water supply shortage for agricul-
turally used water in LRGV is reduced to
510,000 acre-feet, the difference between the
maximum annual quantity of water that could
be productively used in the LRGV under
average weather conditions (1.41 million acre-
feet) and the initial LRGV water supply of
900,000 acre-feet.
After Mexico makes the annual required
300,000 acre-feet (V) contract payment the
residual agricultural water deficit in the LRGV
is 210,000 acre-feet and is labeled WUS 2 V,
and the DID water supply is WM 2 V
(550,000 acre-feet) as shown in Figure 3. Sim-
ilar to the low water supply scenario, the
optimal Coasian water repayment level, Ve, is
much smaller than the contractual requirement.
The optimal repayment level is 55,000 acre-feet,
which equates the shadow price of the deficit
water in both countries at $11.20 per acre-foot
(le). The equilibrium shadow price is lower for
the average water supplycondition than the low
water supply condition due to the decreasing
net marginal benefit of water in agricultural use
in each country. After optimal Coasian water
compensation is paid, the DID water supply is
795,000 acre-feet (WM 2 Ve) and the residual
agricultural shortage in the LRGV is
455,000 acre feet (WUS 2 Ve).
Figure 3. Coasian Solution: Five-Year Repayment Policy, Average Water Supply
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States with a lump dollar sum payment equal
to le*[V 2 Ve] for the nondelivered water.
Under the 5-year repayment plan Mexico
annually releases 55,000 acre-feet of water to
the United States for a total water repayment
of 275,000 acre-feet. As reported in Table 3,
over the 5-year contract, the net present values
for the Coasian gains are $5.1 million for the
United States and $3.8 million for Mexico.
Five-Year Repayment with High
Water Supplies
The Coasian solution with high water supplies
in each country is illustrated in Figure 4. With
high water supplies, 1,200,000 acre-feet of
water is available in the LRGV and Mexico’s
DID initial water supply level is also
1,200,000 acre-feet. Mexico’s net marginal
benefit curve is now 1,200,000 acre-feet long
(WM), four times longer than under the low
water supply condition. The first 850,000 acre-
feet of the NMBM curve is identical to the
curve used in the average water supply
scenario and the additional 350,000 acre-feet
of length reflect the additional net economic
value the additional water will generate in
agricultural production in Mexico’s Rio Con-
chos Basin. In contrast, the MDUS curve now
has a length of only 210,000 acre-feet (WUS),
nearly four times shorter than its length under
the low water supply condition. The length
reduction reflects the fact that under high
water supply levels the maximum water
shortage for agriculturally used water the
LRGV is only 210,000 acre-feet (1,410,000–
1,200,000) in a given year. After Mexico
repays 300,000 acre-feet of the deficit, the
DID’s remaining water supply is 900,000 acre-
feet (WM 2 V) and the LRGV water shortage
is 0 (WUS 2 V).
With high water supplies in each country,
Mexico’s net marginal benefit curve (NMBM)
is located entirely above the U.S. net marginal
damage curve (MDUS) as shown in Figure 4.
The shadow price, l, for the last unit of water
used in Mexico’s DID (the 1,200,000th acre-
foot) is $3.274 and exceeds the shadow price
for the first acre-foot of marginal damage
avoided when the first acre-foot is repaid in
the LRGV ($3.273). In this circumstance, Ve is
equal to 0, and the efficient Coasian outcome
is for compensation to be entirely paid in
Figure 4. Coasian Solution: Five-Year Deficit Repayment Policy, High Water Supply
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acre-foot. The annual cash payment made to
the U.S. is le*V ($3.27 * 300,000) over the
five-year contract repayment period. The net
present values for the Coasian gains, are
$3.2 million for the United States and
$3.7 million for Mexico.
Empirical Results
Table 3 reports the net benefits to the United
States and Mexico under the Coasian ap-
proach for the nine combinations of three
repayment time horizons and three initial
water supply levels relative to identical repay-
ment contracts that require repayment be
made exclusively in water. Also reported
are the dollar and water compensation values
for each Coasian outcome. The empirical
results reveal that the optimal deficit quantity
repaid in water and the net marginal value of
the last unit repaid vary with the initial water
supply level in each country. The equilibrium
shadow price of water, le, is $32.25 per acre-
feet for the low water supply scenario, $11.20
per acre-foot for the average water supply
scenario, and $3.27 per acre-foot for the high
water supply scenario. The greater the initial
water supply is in each country, the lower the
net marginal benefit and cost of water
repayment.
The empirical results are based on a
deterministic static analysis with compensa-
tion taking place in one, or multiple time
periods, with no consideration how current
use might affect the value of water storage
options. The major limitation of performing a
static analysis in one time period, or multiple
time periods, is that the value of water stored
over time is not estimated. A methodological
extension would be to incorporate U.S. and
Mexico reservoir storage capacity into the
analysis and estimate how the net marginal
benefit and marginal damage functions change
in a dynamic decision making framework. In
the absence of storage, this analysis made the
assumption that the United States would not
receive economic value for any deficit repay-
ments that caused the LRGV supply level to
exceed 1,410,000 acre-feet in a given year.
Policy Implications
After examining the net marginal value of
water in each region and accounting for
expected delivery losses, the United States
and Mexico could have negotiated a more
efficient agreement by agreeing to repay the
water debt over multiple years and using a
Coasian bargaining approach. When the repay-
ment time horizon is extended beyond one year
and payment is made exclusively in water, U.S.
compensation value increases and Mexico’s
compensation cost decreases relative to repay-
ing the entire deficit in water within one year as
per the negotiated settlement. Moreover, for a
given repayment contract length and water
supply condition, additional net benefits accrue
to both the United States and Mexico when the
two countries consider a negotiated outcome
that allows repayment in dollars and water
instead of exclusively in water. For example,
relative to the negotiated one-year agreement,
assuming average initial water supplies in both
countries, the Coasian approach increases the
U.S. value of repayment by 534% and reduces
Mexico’s cost of repayment by 60%.
The analysis focused on the optimal form
of water repayment in the Rio Grande Basin,
where water is allocated between the United
States and Mexico. However, the Coasian
approach can easily be extended to efficiently
reallocate water supplies between two U.S.
states, or regions, sharing a common fresh
water resource in periods of drought. The
Coasian approach clearly supports the eco-
nomic efficiency of using water markets as an
economic policy instrument to prescribe effi-
cient water allocations and minimize the cost
of water conflicts. Water markets would allow
market forces to allocate water supplies to
their highest economic value while adequately
compensating sellers of those supplies above
the benefits they would receive from the same
unit of water. By marketing water, regions (or
countries) have the flexibility to improve their
respective economic welfare associated with
the use of a shared water resource. Lack of
well-defined property rights and allocation
agreement ambiguity can lead to inefficient
allocation of water resources. When water
Willis and Baker: A Coasian Approach to Efficient Water Allocation 483rights are clearly established, efficient reallo-
cation trades can be generated annually to
maximize the joint economic welfare of the
trading regions.
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